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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGES. RING\VOOD, HAROLD 
T. RINGWOOD, LUELLA DUN-
CAN and ESTHER JANE OS-
WALD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LOTTIE S. BRADFORD, also known 
as Lottie Bradford White, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
8073 
Brief of Defendant and Appellant 
STATE11:ENT OF FACTS 
The defendant and appellant is the owner in fee of 
certain real property situated in Emigration Canyon, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R-94, D-Abstract. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents are the owners in fee of cer-
tain real property immediately Westerly of and conti-
guous to the property owned by appellant. R-94, P-1. 
Appellant's predecessors in title acquired their property 
about the year 1934. Appellant acquired her property 
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about 1946, and she is the present owner. R-D4, D Ab-
stract. Respondents' predecessors in title acquired their 
property about the year 1924. R-62-63, 94, P-2. Re-
spondents acquired their property from their predeces-
sors about 1946. R-94, P ex. 2. The calls in the deeds to 
the property of the respective parties show that the west-
erly boundary of appellant's property coincides with the 
easterly boundary of the respondent's property. R-94, 
P ex. 1, D Abstract. The property which is the subject of 
this dispute is a triangular piece, bounded on the West 
by a fence, on the East by the common line referred to 
above and on the North by part of the line which would 
appear from the deed calls to partially bound the re-
spondent's property on the North. At the South, the 
West and East boundaries of the disputed portion almost 
intersect at the Southwest corner of appellant's property 
and the Southeast corner of Respondents' property. Said 
disputed portion is described as follows and contains 
.0897 acres : 
Beginning at a point North 1095.16 feet and East 
1223.37 feet from the Southwest Corner of the 
Southeast Quarter of Section 32, Township 1 
North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian, thence South 183.97 feet to intersection of 
an old fence line; thence follo\ving said fence line 
North 14°-09' West 173.78 feet; thence North 
70° -00' East 45.21 feet to beginning. R-94, D-ex. 10. 
The fence has bounded this property on the West 
for about 27 years. R-60, 61. The shape of the property 
and the location of the fence and appellant's cabin is 
shown best in defendant's exhibit D-10. 
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Appellant's predecessor in title was her daughter 
\vho was also one of the witnesses at the trial, Margaret 
Bradford Pitts. R44. Respondents' predecessors in title 
were their parents, now both deceased. Actually appel-
lant's husband was given the property for work he had 
done and he in turn had given it to his daughter. R-47, 48. 
He is also now deceased. 
When Margaret Bradford Pitts acquired title to ap-
pellant's property, the fence in question was already in 
existence and was apparently assumed to be the boundary 
line between the Ringwood and the Bradford property. 
R-45, 46, 52, 54, 57. Such being the case in 1934, the Brad-
fords built their cabin near the fence line, said location 
being the most favorable spot in which to build a cabin 
on 'vhat was assumed to be the Bradford property. R-46, 
47, 52. As a matter of fact, the cabin was constructed al-
most entirely on the disputed piece of property. That 
same cabin has existed in its same location ever since 
its original construction. R-51, 52. The fence has also 
always existed in its present location, only 4.7 feet to 7.3 
feet from the cabin. R-51, R-94-D ex. 10. At the time the 
Bradfords acquired the property and built their cabin, 
the fence line was adopted and thought of as the bound-
ary between the Bradford and the Ringwood property. 
R-64, 52, 54. Ever since the Bradford cabin was built, 
the Bradford family have occupied their cabin and prop-
erty up to the fence line. R-27, 28, 46. The Ringwood 
family on the other hand, have never attempted to occupy 
nor possess any of the property East of the fence line. 
R-46-76. They have never made any claim to property 
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East of the fence, and have tacitly acquiesced in and 
recognized the fence-line as the boundary line. R-5:2, 37. 
It was only when the Ringwoods decided to sell their 
property that they had a survey made and discovered 
that the fence and cabin was ostensibly on the Ringwood 
property. R-27, 52. This survey was conducted about 
the year 1951. R23-. From 1934 to the present time the 
parties hereto and their respective families and pre-
decessors in title have occupied their respective premises 
up to the fence-line. R-23, 27, 44, 50. No one ever ques-
tioned that the fence was not the boundary line until the 
present dispute arose. R-46, 52. There is evidence of a 
conversation between the elder 1\fr. Bradford and Harold 
Ringwood, one of the Respondents, to the effect that the 
fence was considered the boundary. R-57. This claim was 
never contested nor disputed. R-47, 76. 
Witnesses for the Respondent testified that the fence 
was originally built for the purpose of keeping sheep out 
of the Ringwood property. R-61. However, the Ring-
woods admit that they never attempted to occupy East 
of the fenceline, that they were familiar with the fence 
and Bradford cabin and that they were aware of the 
Bradford occupancy. R-:25, 27, 70, 75. It was not until 
the present dispute arose that the Ringwoods ever as-
serted any claim to property East of the fenceline. R-27, 
32, 57. 
Respondents acquired their property from their 
mother about 1946. R-94, P ex. 1. The parents and the 
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children frequently visited the Ringwood property and 
were undoubtedly aware of the situation and location of 
the Bradford cabin and the fence-line in question. R-25, 
27, 75. The respondents, as children of the elder Ring-
\voods, frequently visited the property and even stayed 
there from time to time. R-27. During all the 18 years 
prior to this dispute, some members of each of the fami-
lies have visited the properties, and there has never been 
any question as to the true boundary. R-47, 76. 
There is some evidence that the Ringwood family 
suspected that the fenceline was not the true boundary. 
George Ringwood, one of the respondents testified that 
one Fisher had surveyed the Ringwood property nearly 
twenty years ago. However, there is no evidence that he 
or any of the Ringwood family took steps to make this 
known to the appellant. They merely kept silent and con-
tinued to acquiesce in the fence as the boundary line. 
R-76. 
This action was commenced by plaintiffs and re-
spondents against the defendant and appellant as an ac-
tion in ejectment and for damages for the wrongful deten-
tion of the disputed property. R-1. Their claim for dam-
ages was waived at the beginning of the trial. R-17. The 
defendant and appellant counter-claimed, claiming the 
disputed property under the theory of the doctrine of ac-
quiescence. R-3, 6. The trial court found the issues on 
plaintiffs' complaint in favor of plaintiff and against de-
fendant and on defendant's counter-claim, the court 
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found the issues in favor of the plaintiffs and against 
the defendant. R-80. 
The trial court found that the respondents are the 
owners of in fee of the property subject to this dispute, 
that the appellant is the owner of the real property im-
mediately to the east of said property, that the appel-
lant's cabin has stood and does stand wrongfully upon the 
premises of the respondent, that the cabin of appellant 
was resting upon respondents' property, that said fence 
was not used or intended as a boundary fence by the 
respondent nor their predecessors, and , that the re-
spondents were entitled to judgment requiring appellants 
to remove her cabin from the said property. The court 
decreed that appellant should remove her cabin from 
said property within 30 days from entry of the decree. 
R-83, 84, 85, 86. 
From the foregoing findings and decree, the defend-
ant and appellant now brings this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
1. THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
FOUND THAT SAID FENCE HAS BEEN ESTA-
BLISHED AS THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE 
APPELLANT'S AND RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIES-
CENCE. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING THAT SAID FENCE WAS NOT USED 
OR INTENDED AS A BOUNDARY FENCE BY THE 
PLAINTIFF RESPONDENTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
That the trial court should have found that said 
fence has been established as the boundary between the 
appellant's and respondents' property by the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. That the trial court erred 
in finding that said fence was not used or intended as a 
boundary fence by plaintiff respondents. 
As appears from the record, the appellant and re-
spondents have lived peaceably on their respective prop-
erties as neighbors for approximately 18 years. During 
all of this time, the cabin of appellants has remained in 
its present location just a. few feet from the fence. The 
appellant contends that the fence has been adopted and 
acquiesced in as the boundary line between appellant and 
respondents property. It has existed in its present loca-
tion for more than twenty five years. Until the present 
dispute arose, neither respondents nor their predecessors 
in title have claimed that the fence-line was not the true 
boundary line. The respondents have not actually or 
constructively occupied nor did they attempt to occupy 
east of the fence-line. They made no claim to the tri-
angular piece of property subject of this dispute. Their 
conduct has always been consistent with recognition of 
the fence as the boundary line. They have acquiesced in 
the fence as the boundary line for 18 years. Such being 
the case, appellant contends that the case comes within 
the doctrine of "boundary by acquiescence". 
,_ 
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This doctrine has been long established within the 
State of Utah and is well stated in the leading ease of 
Brown vs. Milliner, 232 Pac. 2nd 202, (Ut. 1951). 
In that case plaintiff sued to quiet title to certain 
property and defendants counterclaimed on the doctrine 
of boundary acquiescence. Defendants had occupied the 
disputed portion for about forty years. However, the 
evidence showed that there was some joint user of the 
land by both parties. Plaintiff's conduct was always con-
sistent with ownership of the disputed portion. In up-
holding the judgment of the trial court in favor of the 
plaintiff, this court said: 
'' ... It has long been recognized in this state that 
when the location of the true boundary between 
two adjoining tracts of land is unknown, uncertain 
or in dispute, the owners thereof may by parol 
agreement, establish the boundary line and there-
by irrevocably bind themselves and their grantees 
( Rydalch vs. Anderson, 37 U t. 99, 107 Pac. 25; 
Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Ut. 57, 276 Pac. 912). In the 
latter case, this court pointed out that when the 
location of the true boundary is known to the ad-
joining owners any parol agreement between them 
establishing the boundary elsewhere would be an 
attempt to transfer an interest in realty without 
complying with the statute of frauds, but we 
stated, if the location is not kno,vn to the adjoining 
owners, a parol agreement between them fixing its 
location is not regarded as transferring an in-
terest in land, but merely determining the loca-
tion of exisiting estates ... ". 
The court further states in the Brown vs. 1Iilliner 
case citing the case of Tripp vs. Bagley: 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
" ... the Tripp case does not require a party rely-
ing upon a boundary which has been acquiesced in 
for a long period of time to produce evidence that 
the location of the true boundary was ever known, 
uncertain or ·in dispute. That the true boundary 
was uncertain or indispute and that the parties 
agreed upon the recognized boundary as the divid-
ing line will be implied from the parties' acquies-
cence.'' 
The difference between the instant case and the 
Brown case is that in this case respondents conduct is 
not consistent with ownership. Until this dispute arose, 
respondents did no act nor said no word which would 
imply that they claimed the disputed portion. For 18 
years they acquiesced in the fence-line as the boundary. 
And all this time respondents were aware of the fact 
appellant and her predecessors were actively occupying 
the disputed portion up to the fence-line. 
The reason for this doctrine is expressed in the case 
of Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 Pac. 2nd 205 (Ut. 1951). In that 
case a common grantor owned certain property. He 
erected a fence between two lots and conveyed the two 
lots to plaintiff's and defendant's successors. Plaintiff 
sued to quiet title up to a fence-line, basing his case upon 
the doctrine of acquiescence. The record showed that 
defendant's father and predecessor helped reconstruct 
the fence in 1927. He conveyed to defendent in 1935. 
Fourteen year later, defendant asserted ownership to the 
disputed land. The court found acquiescence for only 
eight years and gave judgment in favor of plaintiff. In 
affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
plaintiff, this court well stated the reasoning and theory 
upon which this doctrine rests, as follows : 
''. . . This is so because the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence rests upon so"und public policy of 
avoiding trouble and litigation over boundaries." 
And in the case of Blanchard vs. Smith, 255 Pac. 
2nd 729 (Utah), this court said: 
"Our conclusions have been predicated on a prin-
cipal of repose designed to set at rest boundaries 
commonly the subject of strife.'' 
The Brown vs. Milliner case says citing the case of 
Glenn vs. Whitney, 209 Pac. 2nd 257 (Ut. 1949): 
'' ... that the rule is bottomed on the fiction that 
at some time in the past, the adjoining owners 
were in dispute or uncertain as to the location of 
the true boundary and that they compromised 
their differences by agreeing upon the recognized 
boundary as the dividing line between the proper-
ties.'' 
The case of Holmes vs. Judge, 31 Ut. 269, 87 Pac. 
1009, was an action to quiet title to real property by plain-
tiff, in which defendant counterclaimed claiming under 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. A fence sepa-
rated the properties of the parties for about 30 years 
prior to suit. During this period the evidence showed that 
the children of both of the original owners had lived upon 
the properties when quite small, thus leaving the infer-
ence that the families of the owners lived there for many 
years at least, and thus not only acquiesced in, but must 
have recognized the fence as the boundary. It was open 
10 
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and visible for all those years and no one raised any 
question respecting the boundary or that the fence did not 
constitute the true division line until the respondent 
plaintiff brought the action. At the trial plaintiff was 
granted judgment and defendant appealed. This court 
reversed the trial court and said citing the case of B aid-
tv in vs. Brown, 16 N.Y. 363, in reference to implied agree-
ments establishing a boundary line : 
''The supposition of such an agreement in cases 
of long acquiescence in an established line is, as I 
apprehend, entirely superfluous. The acquies-
cence in such cases affords ground, not merely for 
an inference of fact to go to the jury as evidence 
of an original parol agreement, but for a direct 
legal inference as to the true boundary line. It is 
held proof of so conclusive a nature that the party 
is precluded from offering any evidence to the 
contrary ... '' 
Accordingly, the silence of the respondents for these 
18 years should be entitled to great weight. After sleep-
ing on their rights for such a long period of years, they 
should not now be heard to say that they never recognized 
the fence-line as the boundary. 
The Holmes case continues as follows: 
" ... It is squarely held, however, that long ac-
quiescence in a boundary that is visibly marked, or 
placed where it can be observed by the adjoining 
owner, is sufficient to establish a boundary from 
which neither party may depart at will.'' 
And quoting Judge Cooley in the case of Diehl vs. 
Zanger, 39 Mich. 601, the Holmes case continues: 
11 
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"But another view should have been equally con-
clusive in this case. The long practical acquies-
cence of the parties concerned in the supposed 
boundary lines should be regarded as such an 
agreement upon them as to be conclusive, even 
if originally located erroneously.'' 
Then citing the case of Husted vs. Willoughby, 
75 N.W. 279: 
'' ... The same court held that, where a boundary 
line was located by mistake by one party and ac-
quiesced in for more than 15 years, such boundary 
will not be disturbed. '' 
Further citing the Holmes case: 
''. . . Counsel for respondent, however contend 
that the improvements and fence were erected by 
tenants and that the owners are not to be bound 
by the acts of such tenants. Grant this and there 
remains the fact that the owners and their succes-
sors and grantees by implication of law adopted 
the acts of those tenants by acquiescence therein 
for more than 30 years.'' 
'' ... While as all the authorities agree, no hard 
and fast rule can be laid down to control in every 
case, but that each case must be determined by its 
own peculiar facts and circumstances, still where, 
as in this case, the facts respecting the acquies-
cence for so many years, and the open and visible 
boundary so clearly established, and the know-
ledge thereof by interested parties is so clearly 
shown, the general principles recognized by all 
authorities apply with full force, and we cannot 
do otherwise than to give them effect. We do not 
'vish to be understood as holding that parties may 
not claim to the true boundary, were an assumed 
12 
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or agreed boundary is located through mistake or 
inadvertence, or were it is clear that the line as 
located was not intended as a boundary, and where 
a boundary so located has not been acquiesced in 
for a long term of years by the parties in interest. 
But in all cases where the boundary is open and 
visibly marked by monuments, fences or buildings, 
and is knowingly acquieseed in for a term of years, 
the law will imply an agreement fixing the bound-
ary as located, and will not permit the parties or 
their grantees to depart from such line . 
. . . While the interest of society require that the 
title to real estate shall not be transferred from 
the owner for slight cause, or otherwise than by 
law, these same interest demand that there shall 
be stability in boundaries, and that, where parties 
for a long term of years acquiesced in certain line 
between their own and neighbor's property, they 
will not thereafter be permitted to say that what 
they permitted to appear as being established by 
and with their consent and agreement was in 
fact false. ' ' 
In the instant case we have a fence which was adopt-
ed and established as a boundary line 18 years ago and 
nothing but silence has been heard from the respondents 
and their predecessors in all that time. The evidence 
clearly shows that respondents were aware of the loca-
tion of the fence and appellant's cabin. The fenee was 
open and visible and clearly established for respondents 
to observe and as respondents readily admit. Certainly 
they permitted the fence-line to appear as being esta-
blished as the boundary line. They should not now be 
allowed to be heard to say that the fence-line was not ac-
quiesced in as the boundary line. And their silence and 
13 
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inactivity must be considered as acquiescence within the 
meaning of the doctrine, even though the trial court must 
have overlooked this fact. 
Furthermore, the instant case is a family situation 
much the same as in the Holmes case. Members of both 
the Ringwood and the Bradford families either lived 
upon or frequently visited their respective properties. 
It must be presumed that the families must have not only 
acquiesced in, but must have recognized the fence as the 
boundary line. The fence-line was open and visible for 
all those 18 years, as was the location of the appellant's 
cabin, and was not questioned as the true division line 
until respondents brought this action. 
Furthermore, the acquiescence in this case is much 
longer than the minimum period required under the hold~ 
ing of Ekberg vs. Bates, cited above. On this point, 
that case says: 
"The length of time necessary to establish a 
boundary line by acquiescence has never been 
established in this jurisdiction. Each case must 
usually be determined on its own facts. In other 
jurisdictions there have been statements which 
indicate that the length of time should be at least 
that prescribed by the statute of limitations. In 
the instant case as we have pointed out above, 
there was a period of actual acquiescence for more 
than seven years before appellant acquired title 
and under all the circumstances shown herein that 
was sufficient length of time to establish the line 
so that appellants are precluded from claiming 
that it is not the true line.'' 
14 
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In the case at hand, the acquiescence has existed for 
a very minimum of 18 years. Add or take away a few 
years, one way of another, would not significantly change 
the fact of acquiescence in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion appellant respectfully submits that this 
court should enter its order reversing the District Court 
and should set aside its Findings, Conclusions and Decree 
and enter as its final judgment a decree quieting title to 
the disputed portion of real property in the appellant 
and against the respondents on the grounds that the sub-
ject fence-line has been established as the boundary line 
betwen appellant's and respondents' property by their 
mutual acquiescence therein. 
The fence involved herein was established and adopt-
ed as the boundary line between the properties when ap-
pellant's predecessors built their cabin in 1934. The ap-
pellant and her predecessors have always actively and 
physically occupied and claimed up to the fence-line 
from the time the cabin was built to the time this dispute 
arose in 1952. Respondents knew that appellant and her 
predecessors were claiming and occupying up to the 
fence-line. Respondents admit that they did not attempt 
to question the occupancy of appellant nor did they do 
anything consistent with claiming ownership to the dis-
puted property. Assuming that the fence was not ori-
ginally erected with the view of it being the boundary 
line, it was so established and adopted by both parties 
15 
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when appellant's cabin was built only three to seven feet 
East of the fence-line. The fence was openly visible and 
the boundary was plainly marked. The respondents ad-
mit familiarity with the fence and appellant's cabin and 
their respective locations. For 18 years they acquiesced 
in this boundary which they would now have the courts 
unsettle which is contrary to our public policy to unsettle 
long established boundaries. The respondents and their 
predecessors have slept on their rights for this long 
period of years and should now be estopped from claim-
ing that the fence-line is not the boundary line. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. GIBSON, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
